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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to good character but prior to a Board meeting at which the
application and references were to be considered, the Board
Secretary was prompted to make further inquiry. Thereafter,
at the hearing, applicant was apparently afforded full oppor-
tunity to explain derogatory information which came to the
Board but failed to explain it satisfactorily; the Board concluded
"it was not satisfied that relatrix was of good moral character"
and denied a license.
The court limited its review to determining "whether the
Board abused its discretion in refusing the application ... and
whether or not it deprived her of due process of law by con-
ducting the hearing . . . improperly and illegally."'21 Having
considered the record, the court found the Board had not abused
its discretion in concluding as it did. While indicating that "the
holder of a license has a property right which cannot be cur-
tailed or revoked, save for causes prescribed by law . . . on
charges formally made and heard contradictorily," the court
concluded that "an applicant for a license is not entitled to a
hearing before the Board. ' 22 (Emphasis added.) Rather than
thus relying so greatly upon judicial review as a check upon
administratrive arbitrariness, the court might have affirmed
the hearing afforded as satisfying fair procedure; in Perpente
v. Moss, 23 an opinion often approvingly cited, a New York court
has said that "a license may not be refused on the ground that
the applicant 'is not a person of good character' unless the ap-
plicant has fair opportunity to meet a challenge to his good
character and unless the court of review is apprised of the basis




The "Gas Sign Ordinance," which appears to have been
spreading like a rash throughout the municipalities of the coun-
try in the last few years, was held unconstitutional in two cases
21. 238 La. 502, 510, 115 So.2d 833, 836 (1959).
22. Id. at 530, 115 So.2d at 844.
23. 293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E.2d 726 (1944).
24. Id. at 329, 56 N.E.2d at 727.
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
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decided during the past term.' Under the guise of preventing
fraud in the retailing of gasoline and other petroleum products,
and promoting beautification of the locality, this type of ordi-
nance prohibits the placing of signs or signboards in excess of a
certain size on, near, or about the premises where gasoline is
sold at retail.
In the first case, the defendant was prosecuted for a viola-
tion of the ordinance, and successfully moved in the trial court
to quash the affidavit on the ground that the ordinance was an
arbitrary and discriminatory interference with private business,
and violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions. 2 In the second case, the plain-
tiff successfully enjoined the enforcement of the ordinance in
the court below.3
Both cases were affirmed on appeal, and in both the Supreme
Court recognized and applied the majority rule throughout the
country on these ordinances. The latter were held to have no
reasonable relation to public health, safety, morals, or welfare,
and to have been adopted to encourage monopolistic practices in
the retailing of gasoline and other petroleum products. Both of
the challenged ordinances were held violative of the constitu-
tional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law.
In the second case, the Supreme Court affirmed its prior
rule4 that injunction lies to prevent enforcement of a purely
penal statute or ordinance where:
(1) There is a clear invasion of a property right;
(2) The statute or ordinance is manifestly unconstitutional
on its face; and
(3) There is irreparable injury threatened.
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Two cases involved the construction and application of the
Public Contracts Act5 requiring the award of contract for public
1. City of Lake Charles v. Hasha, 238 La. 636, 116 So.2d 277 (1959) ; Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 238 La. 936, 117 So.2d 64 (1960).
2. City of Lake Charles v. Hasha, 238 La. 636, 116 So.2d 277 (1959).
3. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 238 La. 936, 117 So.2d 64
(1960).
4. Announced in LeBlanc v. City of New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212
(1915).
5. LA. R.S. 38:2211-2217 (1950).
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work or purchases to the lowest responsible bidder, after adver-
tisement for bids.
The first of these concerned the award of a contract for the
construction of storm drainage improvements by a drainage dis-
trict. The plaintiff, who had submitted the low bid for all work
for which bids had been solicited, sought to annul the award by
the defendant drainage district to another bidder, and to compel
acceptance of plaintiff's bid. The work for which bids were
solicited consisted of twelve parts, on each of which the bidders
were required to submit bid breakdowns on each section, part,
or segment of the work, for the convenience of the drainage dis-
trict in determining the cost of each. When the bids were opened,
the drainage district found that it had insufficient funds to
cover the cost of all twelve parts, so it eliminated two of these,
and then accepted the low bid of another bidder on the ten re-
tained parts of the project.
The majority of the court held that nothing in the plans,
specifications, and contract documents submitted to the bidders
justified this procedure, which was an illegal change in the con-
tract. The court annulled the award of the bidder to the low
bidder on the parts of the project which the district decided to
proceed with, but refused to order the acceptance of the plain-
tiff's bid on these ten parts.
The writer is more impressed with the reasoning of the dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice McCaleb than with that of the
majority opinion. It would appear to the writer that the action
of the drainage district was specifically authorized by the plans,
specifications, and contract document. The crux of the matter
appears to be set forth in the following language of the dissent-
ing opinion :7
"The proposal signed by all bidders in presenting their
separate bids to the Drainage District declares, in part:
" 'The undersigned bidder understands that the break-
down of bid items into Sections, Parts and Segments is solely
for the convenience of the Owner in determining cost of vari-
ous sections of the work, and that all work to be done will be
awarded under one contract.
6. W. It. Aldrich & Co. v. Gravity Drainage District No. 1, 238 La. 190, 114
So.2d 860 (1959).
7. Id. at 203, 114 So.2d at 865.
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"'The Owner reserves the right to remove any section,
Part or Segment of work from the contract.'" (Dissenting
Justice's emphasis.)
In the second case8 involving the Public Contracts Act, a
local housing authority sued the low bidder on a construction
contract for damages resulting from his failure to comply with
his bid after its acceptance. Two defenses were urged by the
defendant contractor: (1) there was no timely and unqualified
acceptance of defendant's bid; and (2) the bid was withdrawn
prior to plaintiff's unqualified acceptance.
The local authority, through newspaper advertisement, so-
licited bids for the construction of a housing project to be built
in cooperation with the Federal Public Housing Administration.
The solicitation for bids stipulated that the authority should
have thirty days for the acceptance of the low bid, and that "No
bid shall be withdrawn for a period of thirty (30) days subse-
quent to the opening of bids without the consent of [the local
authority] ."
Bids for the contract were opened by the local authority at
2:00 p.m., on April 22, 1952. By resolution adopted immediate-
ly thereafter, the local authority accepted the defendant's low
bid for the work, and authorized its director to enter into a writ-
ten contract covering the work, "subject to the approval of the
Public Housing Administration." The latter approved the bid
and contract on May 12, 1952, but the local authority failed to
notify the contractor of this approval. Shortly after 2:00 p.m.,
on May 22, 1952, the contractor attempted to withdraw its bid;
and at 3:35 p.m. that same day the director of the housing
authority advised the contractor by telegram of the unqualified
acceptance of the contractor's bid.
The contractor's first contention, which had been sustained
by the trial court, was swept aside on appeal. The Supreme
Court held, arguendo gratia, that even if the local authority's
original acceptance of defendant's bid subject to the approval of
the federal agency would be deemed a conditional one, this con-
dition was fulfilled through approval of the bid and contract by
the Federal Public Housing Administration. The contractor's
second contention was answered by the appellate court through
an application of the general rules relating to the computation




of time.9 Under the latter, the day on which the bids were
opened was to be excluded, so that the thirty days allowed the
local authority for the acceptance of the bid was held to have
expired at sunset on May 22, 1952. Since the bid was accepted
at 3:30 p.m. on that day, the contract was held to be have been
completed by this acceptance.
PUBLIC FINANCE
The two significant cases in this field decided by the Su-
preme Court during its last term both involved issues raised by
recent amendments of basic statutory law.
R.S. 17:89 authorizes parish school boards to anticipate
their tax revenues by borrowing a certain percentage thereof,
and to "pledge as security therefor their revenues for that cur-
rent year, calendar or fiscal, as the case may be, and no longer."
Under this statutory section, the Orleans Parish School Board is
authorized "to borrow as much as three fourths of the expected
revenue.'.
Prior to 1959, R.S. 47:1997 provided that the assessment
rolls in Orleans Parish should be filed on or before October 15th
of each year, and that the "collection of taxes shall begin on the
first day of January of each year for which such taxes are
levied." In 1959, this statutory provision was amended ° so as to
provide that the assessment rolls in this parish should be filed
on or before March 15th of each year, and that the collection of
taxes shall begin on June 1st of each year. As amended, this
section further provides that if one-half of the taxes due are
paid during the month of June, the other half may be paid dur-
ing the month of October of each year.
On September 28, 1959, the Orleans Parish School Board
adopted a resolution which authorized the borrowing of a cer-
tain sum less than three-fourths of the anticipated tax revenues
for 1960, and the pledging of the tax receipts for that year as
security therefor. The proposed loan and pledge was duly ap-
proved by the State Bond and Tax Board. Thereafter, in Hen-
drieks v. Orleans Parish School Board," an elector and taxpayer
9. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2057, 2058 (1870). Similar rules have been adopt-
ed for the computation of procedural delays by LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Art. 5059 (1960).
10. By La. Acts 1959, No. 125, § 1.
11. 298 La. 243, 117 So.2d 66 (1960).
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of Orleans Parish sought to enjoin the school board from bor-
rowing more than half of the anticipated taxes of 1960, on the
ground that it could not reasonably expect to collect more than
half of these taxes prior to June 30, 1960, and hence should be
prevented from borrowing and pledging during one fiscal year
revenues which would be received during the subsequent fiscal
year.
Both the trial and appellate courts refused to grant in-
junctive relief. Both held that since all of the tax revenues
sought to be pledged fell due prior to June 30, 1960, and may be
paid during the fiscal year 1959-1960, a pledge thereof was
authorized under the provisions of R.S. 17:89. The question pre-
sented was of great importance to the defendant school board, as
a contrary ruling by the courts would have deprived it, during
the fiscal year 1959-1960, of more than $6,000,000.
The second of these two cases 12 involved the validity of a spe-
cial election which authorized the issuance of bonds by a sewer-
age district.
R.S. 33:3881-3889 authorized the creation of sewerage dis-
tricts outside of the corporate limits of municipalities, enumer-
ated their powers, provided for the administration thereof, and
named the police jury as the governing authority of the districts
created. R.S. 39:471, listing the governing authorities of various
local governmental districts, municipal and parochial, also desig-
nated the police jury as the governing authority of these sewer-
age districts. Both of these statutory provisions accorded with
the constitutional grant of the legislative power, 1 3 which specif-
ically designated the police jury as the governing authority of
such districts.
In 1952, this constitutional provision was amended 14 so as to
delete the specific designation therein of the police jury as the
governing authority of such districts, thus leaving the legisla-
ture free to depart from such designation. Legislation of that
same year, conditioned on the adoption of the constitutional
amendment just referred to, amended R.S. 13:3885-3889, and
added a new R.S. 33:3890. Under these amended sections, the
police jury was required to designate a Board of Supervisors as
12. Johnson v. Sewerage District No. 2, 239 La. 840, 120 So.2d 262 (1960).
13. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 14(c).
14. On November 4, 1952, pursuant to La. Acts 1952, No. 494.
1961]
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the governing authority of each such district, composed of three
property taxpayers residing within the district.
The majority of the qualified taxpayers, both in number and
assessment, of the defendant sewerage district voted to author-
ize the issuance of bonds for the purpose of constructing, main-
taining, and operating a sewerage disposal plant. This election
was called and conducted under a resolution of the Board of
Supervisors of the district, as the governing authority thereof.
The plaintiff taxpayers sought to annul this election, primarily
on the ground that under R.S. 39:471, the police jury of the
parish was the governing authority of the sewerage district, and
it alone had the power to call such a special election. A judgment
of the trial court sustaining the plaintiffs' contentions, and an-
nulling the special bond election, was reversed by the Supreme
Court. After an examination of the history of the pertinent con-
stitutional and statutory provisions, the appellate court experi-
enced little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
provisions of R.S. 39:471 were superseded and repealed by
implication, to the extent that they conflicted with the 1952
amendment of R.S. 33:3885-3889. The remaining contentions of
the plaintiffs 6 were held to be without merit.
MISCELLANEOUS
Three cases in the field of Local Government Law are of suf-
ficient interest to justify mention, en passant.
In the Hearty case, " an officer of the New Orleans Police
Department was suspended by the superintendent, as a result of
the officer's indictment in the United States District Court for
allegedly making false statements to a federal agency. The off i-
cer appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which annulled
the suspension on the ground that the superintendent had acted
on the indictment alone, and had made no investigation or de-
termination as to the truth, reasonableness, or weight of the evi-
15. Other grounds of nullity urged by the plaintiff were the failure of the
Board of Supervisors to appoint an election commission, or deputy, who was
opposed to the bond proposal; the departure of some of the election commissioners
during the election, and the appointment of substitutes; and the failure to provide
booths for secret voting. All of these were disposed of through application of the
general rule that, in the absence of fraud, corruption, or proof that the irregulari-
ties complained of changed the result of the election, the latter would not be an-
nulled because of the failure of ministerial officers to perform every formal act
required by law.




dence. Although the Civil Service Commission held the sus-
pension illegal, it refused to allow back pay for the period of
suspension. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Commis-
sion on the latter point. Following its decision in Hermann v.
New Orleans Police Department,'17 it held that the Commission
had no discretion in the matter; and having held the suspension
illegal, should have allowed back pay during the period of sus-
pension. Mr. Justice McCaleb, who had written a vigorous dis-
senting opinion in the Hermann case, concurred in the Hearty
decision, stating that "the jurisprudence is now established and
I conceive it my duty to henceforth subscribe thereto."
Wyatt v. Hagler '8 presented no novel or particularly interest-
ing point of law, and involved only the application of settled
rules relating to a tacit, or implied, dedication of a strip of land
as a public street. The matter which intrigues this writer, how-
ever, is the manner in which two different groups of able and
experienced judges can so easily reach diametrically opposite
findings of fact on the same record. In this respect, the case is a
fascinating experiment in forensic psychology. In a unanimous
and completely convincing opinion,'9 the court of appeal af-
firmed the trial judge's findings of fact, and held that there was
no tacit dedication of the strip of land in question, since the
owner had repeatedly protested the municipality's attempt to
maintain it as a public street, and eventually the municipality
had discontinued plans to black-top the strip because of these
protests. In another unanimous and equally convincing opin-
ion,20 the Supreme Court found that there was a tacit dedication
of the strip, as the owner had permitted the city to maintain it
as a public street for more than seventeen years, and had never
protested to officials of the municipality. Mr. Justice Hawthorne
dissented from the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant a re-
hearing.
This type of case raises some doubt as to both the efficacy
and advisability of dual reviews of the findings of fact of a trial
court. It is to be hoped that the additional time made available
to the Supreme Court by the recent appellate reorganization will
be devoted to the review of legal questions of general importance
to the people of Louisiana.
17. 238 La. 81, 113 So.2d 612 (1959).
18. 238 La. 234, 114 So.2d 876 (1959), reversing Wyatt v. Hagler, 107 $o.2d
568 (La. App. 1958).
19. Wyatt v. Hagler, 107 So.2d 568 (La. App. 1958).
20. Id., 238 La. 234, 114 So.2d 876 (1959).
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Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board2 1 is probably
the most important case in this area of the law decided by the
Supreme Court during the past term, but it need not be dis-
cussed in detail here. It, and the prior Duree case, 22 are the sub-
jects of an extended criticism appearing in a recent issue of the
Review. Further, both of these unfortunate cases have now been
overruled by a recent constitutional amendment. 24
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
This term witnessed another chapter in the continuing ef-
forts of United Gas Corporation to be relieved of the alleged
confiscatory effects of rates fixed by franchise in its "Monroe
Division."' As to the franchise with the City of Monroe, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has effectively placed it beyond modi-
fication except with the consent of the City of Monroe by deci-
sions holding that the city rather than the Louisiana Public
Service Commission had regulatory power over rates and hold-
ing that the city, even though having such regulatory power,
was not bound to exercise it and could hold the utility to its
franchise despite alleged confiscatory effects.2
On an application amended to exclude the City of Monroe,
United Gas asked the Commission to fix new rates in the re-
mainder of the Monroe Division; the City of West Monroe, also
under franchise agreement, filed exceptions urging that the
Commission was without power to alter the franchise. The
Commission denied the application, holding the franchise to be
21. 238 La. 388, 115 So. 793 (1959).
22. Duree v. Maryland Casualty Company, 239 La. 166, 114 So.2d 594 (1959),
reversing Duree v. State, 96 So.2d 854 (La. App. 1957).
23. McMahon & Miller, The Crain Myth-A Criticism of the Duree and
Stephens Cases, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 449 (1960).
24. LA. CoNST. art. III, § 35, as amended on November 8, 1960, pursuant to
La. Acts 1960, No. 621.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. United Gas Corp. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 239 La. 368,
118 So.2d 442 (1960).
2. City of Monroe v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 233 La. 478, 97
So.2d 56 (1957), commented on in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Courtfor the 1957-1958 Term- Public Utilities, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 376
(1959).; United Gas Corp. v. City of Monroe, 236 La. 825, 109 So.2d 433 (1958),
commented on in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959
Term -Public Utilities, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 296 (1960); noted in 20
LOUISIANA LAW REvimw 624 (1960).
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